“The Promises Are Too Big to Ignore for Any Country with Geopolitical Aspirations”

Quantum computers are designed to outpace classical (super-)computers in solving certain categories of mathematical problems. They could come into play in fields like logistics by providing new computing power or by aiding the development of advanced materials and chemicals through simulation. The most concrete and best-known use cases, however, are in cryptography. The chances that future quantum computers will render the current widely used public-key cryptography ineffective are high. An interesting effect of this is that encrypted data might already be hoarded by intelligence agencies so that it can be decrypted with the help of quantum computers at a later time. In this respect, the potential reach of this technology will backdate and not only be confined to future data.

One thing that is important to note: while quantum computing is spearheading the field of quantum technology, it is not the only relevant development. Quantum communication, sensing, imaging – these are all subfields trying to leverage quantum mechanical effects through the controlled manipulation of nature at smaller scales. The security implications of each will depend on the specific use cases. At the moment, it is tough to make good judgements in a field that is often deliberately using the label ​“quantum” to obscure specifics by ​“sounding cool” and that promotes ​“autonomous cars seeing around corners,” to name only one example. Quantum sensing is expected to enable positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) capabilities in situations where GPS might not be available. In other cases, these new quantum applications would ​“merely” allow us to surpass the precision of existing methods by orders of magnitude. So not every technology will necessarily be disruptive and make an entire classical building block of military power obsolete. Most will still prove immensely useful, though.

I would argue that two things are certain at this point: every quantum technology has dual-use character and – although it might be speculative in the sense that there are plenty of engineering problems that could prevent it from reaching technological maturity – a sound scientific basis.

Because quantum technology is still in its infancy and thus smaller in size compared to other high-tech sectors, I expect developments in the semiconductor and AI industries to have implications in quantum technology rather than vice versa. Especially decisions that concern intellectual property and human talent (like the Biden administration’s move to ban US persons from working on chip development in China) could have a lasting impact on international research efforts. If all applied quantum technology is tainted by its potential for dual use, that could make international research collaborations much harder to realize. 

Military and warfare capabilities are surely the elephant in the room, as some analysts suggest that quantum technology could be a way for other countries, notably China, to leapfrog the US’ traditional military advantages by ​‘offsetting’ its key pillars. But aside from pure military strength there is also the economic power that comes with control of quantum technologies. So the promises are too big to ignore for any country with geopolitical aspirations. However, it is unlikely that such disruptions will happen in an instant, let alone simultaneously. The roadmaps to technological maturity for the different technologies are too diverse.

Personally, I am concerned that some of the current buzz, which is perpetuated by the incentive to acquire more funding and investment, widens the gap between expectations and reality – that it creates an excess hype or, framed negatively, an exaggerated fear of being left behind. Such a fear could act as a catalyst for a security dilemma long before we see actual maturity for these technologies. And any such arms race is likely to worsen diplomatic relations more than necessary. Framing the quest for technological progress as a ​‘quantum (arms) race’ also neglects the immense civilian benefits that advancements in quantum technology could bring for our society.

Heisenberg postulated that knowing a particle’s position simultaneously limits the knowledge we can obtain about its momentum. Luckily, political strategies are macroscopic enough to not possess such innate limits. Governments and European policymakers should expand efforts to analyze the status quo to improve their understanding of how fast things are moving and to extrapolate decisions from there – we need to shift from reactive to forward-looking policy to retain strategic autonomy. When it comes to encryption standards, it is likely that a decision has effectively already been made for Europe by the US: the American Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act, which was signed into law in 2022, pushes national agencies to transition to post-quantum cryptography systems. 

If Europe wants to avoid a scenario in which more such path dependencies are imposed on it by external actors, it needs to answer a number of questions. First, what data has priority in terms of securing it for a post-quantum world, and how can the respective systems be made ​‘quantum-proof’ fast? What exactly are the strengths of the German and European ecosystems for the quantum sector? Is it a particular technology, or a part of the supply chain (similar to chips, where design and fabrication are being carried out by different, highly specialized sub-industries)? Or do the uncertainties I described before call for a hedging approach?

In the case of AI, Europe and Germany tried to define their strategic position by laying out a third way, relative to the US and China. How are the lessons from this applicable to quantum technologies? Europe should strive to find (or create) its competitive advantages in the quantum industry – and also work out a plan to stabilize them given how much is still in flux in this sector.

And lastly, while Germany has a long history of fundamental research through its universities and research centers, it lacks coherence in the interplay between fundamental and applied research as well as at the intersection of research and the military and business sectors. These areas demand a closer look.

Logistics and advanced materials are important for civilian use just as much as they are for military use. Quantum computing could, for instance, be used to optimize industrial processes to save resources. An oft-mentioned candidate in this context is the improvement of the Haber-Bosch process of ammonia production, which according to estimates currently accounts for one to two percent of global energy consumption. Quantum-computed simulations could aid drug discovery in the pharmaceutical sector and quantum imaging could enable better medical scans. We should also not forget that we are already leveraging quantum effects every day: GPS would not be possible without existing knowledge of quantum mechanical and relativistic effects.

If understanding the underlying physics enabled such technologies, it is truly exciting to think about the possibilities of controlling it. Mature quantum technology would allow us to manipulate nature at smaller scales more than ever before, a goal well worth its challenges.